Category Archives: The Abstraction Issue

The Abstraction Issue

Julie Mehretu, Mural, 2010, 80’x20′, Goldman Sachs Headquarters, NYC. Photo:
Andrew Russeth (https://www.flickr.com/photos/sixteen-miles/4516600442)

A Cluster of Essays
edited by Kris Cohen and Christa Noel Robbins

The Abstraction Issue: An introduction - Kris Cohen |  Home Economics: Real Abstraction in the Work of Vermeir and Heiremans - Steyn Bergs |  Diagrammatics - Barbara Jaffee | Cady Noland is a Base Materialist - Christa Noel Robbins |  Abstraction, the Irreconcilable: An Interview with American Artist

Abstraction, the Irreconcilable: An Interview with American Artist

American Artist is an interdisciplinary artist whose work extends dialectics formalized in Black radicalism and organized labor into a context of networked virtual life. The following interview draws on mutual interests that I and American Artist had in the graphic user interface or “gooey” of the computer screen, seen in relation to blackness and Black Studies. The interview took place via email between September and November, 2018.

Kris Cohen:

You recently published a great essay titled “Black Gooey Universe” (unbag, issue 2, 2018). There, you argue that the graphic user interface (GUI or phonetically “gooey”) of the personal computer, “a clickable interface, cursor, and remedial computer mouse,” marks a turn in the history of computing. “Before this,” you say, “computer monitors appeared black, a color native to screens at the time, upon which lines of code were input in green or white characters. Between Xerox Alto and Apple Lisa, the negative space of the screen began to appear white…”. You call this transition, from black to white screen, an “apt metaphor for the theft and erasure of [racial] blackness, as well as a literal instance of a white ideological mechanism created with the intent of universal application.” It won’t be a surprise to many people that the tech industry, with its roots in Silicon Valley and U.S. military funding, is peopled almost exclusively by white men (although today they’ve let a few white women into the club, although not without strenuous resistance by men defending their turf). Books like Safiya Umoja Noble’s Algorithms of Oppression draw out some of the implications of this demographic bias.[1] But you are pointing to an anti-blackness that is larger, longer, and more pervasive than could be indicated by the whiteness of the people allowed to work in Silicon Valley. Can you draw out your argument that the GUI, the dominant interface of all personal computers and mobile phones today, is anti-black?

American Artist:

Yeah, I think that’s a pretty accurate summation of the line I’m drawing in the text. It begins with this transitional moment, the introduction of the GUI, and I’m almost ascribing epic quality to it by pointing it out, but it’s a continuation of the underlying framework that started Silicon Valley, and existed long before it in manifest destiny and colonialism in the Western United States. There’s a book by David Naguib Pellow and Lisa Sun-Hee Park titled The Silicon Valley of Dreams that begins with the genocide of Native peoples on the West Coast, hydraulic mining during the gold rush, and the abuse of employees who are largely Asian immigrants that continues into the present.[2] This isn’t something I talk about in the essay but it gives more insight into the nature of the industry. In the essay I’m writing from the perspective of the computer user rather than those fabricating the devices in a factory. Abuse is felt here too but rather than chemical poisoning it’s a psychological issue, as a user I’m being told that whiteness is the foundation of all virtual production, that all things must progress and the only (broken) products I can afford are obsolete. By accessing information through these systems I’m only exposed to what’s considered important under a rubric of white supremacy.

One thing I would clarify is that early computers (when it was someone’s job rather than a device) were primarily women, it was not a men’s field. When it was appropriated by men, the connotation of computation had to move from feminine to masculine. This is something Wendy Chun writes about in “On Software, Or the Persistence of Visual Knowledge,” an essay that was very influential to me while writing Black Gooey Universe.[3]

To your last question (or the thing I was actually supposed to be responding to), I’m saying that if the people who designed the computer are anti-black, intentional or not, that will inevitably be reproduced in what they design, especially if is it something meant to serve “people” in general. There is no “general” when it comes to people, so when we pretend there is what’s really happening is that one person is deciding what’s best for another, and the person deciding is usually the one with the most privilege historically.

KC:

So then I would say that it’s a related, but distinct task to actually trace out how the anti-blackness of the designers and technologists gets into the products—in this case, the graphical user interface. And maybe more importantly, to describe its effects on users and on computation and computational personhood more broadly. I think you start to think about this question when you say, in the same article, that the GUI is “an abstracted representation of a person’s relationship to a machine.” Can you say more about what you mean by “abstracted” here? In part I’m interested in this version of abstraction for its potential to deflect—to better historicize—the canonical modernist version where abstraction is often understood as a flight from referentiality or representation, and then as an exploration of the material conditions of the medium. This is a version of abstraction that many black artists have been able to exploit as a platform for expanding aesthetic politics beyond the requirement (imposed both from within and from without a community of black artists) that they represent black life. But it has also been used by major institutions to rescue artists from their blackness (I’m thinking here about Susan Cahan’s Mounting Frustration: the Art Museum in the Age of Black Power and the account she gives there of “Contemporary Black Artists in America” at the Whitney (1970), which allowed black artists into the canon of modernism only if they could be seen to be participating in some sanctioned version of abstraction in which their art would be cleansed of racial politics).[4] You also have an exhibition with the title “Black Gooey Universe” (Housing, NYC, 2018), so maybe you want to talk about abstraction and the GUI with reference to some of your artworks that address these questions.

AA:

I think the best way to understand how high technology is anti-black is to consider how the United States is anti-black. The United States is foundationally anti-black and continues to extract labor and resources from black people through incarceration and debt among many other practices. To me it’s impossible to consider an entire epoch of development that occurred in a bubble of almost entirely white American men in California, exuding anything other than anti-blackness. In this text I was drawing heavily on afro-pessimist thought, Frank B. Wilderson III, to envisage a black gooey that lives in contradistinction to the white gooey that has become formative for contemporary society.[5] If you want to consider it more pragmatically, it’s like this—there is no such thing as a universality, if one kind of person makes something it will suit the needs of that person and inevitably exclude everyone else. In the case of algorithms, the sets of data on which they are trained are very limited in scope. Hardwares that recognize people often have trouble seeing dark skin. This shouldn’t come as a surprise. However I’m less interested in this aspect. I’m more interested in the psychological or ideological implications of whiteness being posited as neutral. I think this correlation is taken for granted as symbolic but it supports narratives of virtue associated with the color white.

When I say ‘abstracted’ in the text I have yet to enter a discourse of art, though I will speak more about that shortly. What I mean by abstracted is that the symbolic layers between users and the hardwares they interface with are duplicitous. As computers developed, the mechanism itself became more and more hidden to the point that most users don’t understand how their smartphones work. Not only that but the images you see on a phone screen have an arbitrary relation to what happens below. Now you have illustrations referring to specific tasks, such as a line drawing of a phone or a clock, but they don’t really need to look that way, it only looks that way so you can have a causal expectation of what action will occur when you tap on those items. Imagine if you wanted to give someone driving directions to a place from memory and you drew the directions on a piece of paper. Now that person gives that drawing to their car and their car drives them to their destination. We have no idea how the car actually navigates to its destination, but we know it will happen. The hand-written directions are essentially the interface, it’s just a human-readable map to interact with something much more complex happening below.

I wanted to distinguish how I was using the idea of abstraction in the text from how it factors into my work. My sculptures are representational but are indeed abstract. They often appear similar to existing machines but their use is not quite clear. They are also not representative of or associated with a specific (Black) identity. I think, like artists such as David Hammons, I’m already Black, so the works are too. On top of that what I’m discussing is rooted in Black studies, though I often talk about it symbolically. I want to talk about certain difficulties of networked (or post-internet) life without being beholden to depicting high tech devices, the same way I want to speak about Black life without necessarily depicting it, but by having this desire I’ve created a two-fold conundrum. Both of these subjects are hard to depict in such a way, but that’s been my concern since the production of Black Gooey Universe. I have faced situations in which my work has been “rescued from my Blackness” as you put it, which I find to be the troubling aspect of working at the intersection of art and technology. Just like the field of technology, the group of artists working with it is predominantly white and male, and is mostly concerned with the novelty of the devices which they utilize. This has never been interesting to me, and I generally try to remain in conversation with artists that are at least interested in critiquing these forms. The unique thing I’ve noticed about being in an exhibition with many white artists using technology is that I’m not tokenized, because my race is never a factor for my inclusion in the show. I’m the one artist in the show who happens to have a race at all (that isn’t white), so my identity is erased from the work merely by not being engaged with by anyone, including the curator. Afterall, my name makes it easy to do that.

In Black Gooey Universe I wanted to imagine an alternate realm of the interface, one that doesn’t foreground whiteness. Taking something referred to in The Undercommons as ‘the wild beyond’ and applying that to the interface of devices we use most often.[6] To imagine something I considered in opposition to technology as we know it, I focused on qualities that stood in contrast to what we associate with our current devices “black gooey [is] antithetical to the values of the white screen. Black gooey might then be a platform of slowness (“dragged time”, “colored time”), refusal, thought, complexity, critique, softness, loudness, transparency, uselessness, and brokenness.”

Mother of All Demos, 2018 is a computer made of dirt, that’s fallen apart over time. It’s functional, and it displays a command-line interface on a black screen. It’s form is taken from an Apple II, the last personal computer to only use a black interface. Black goo seeps from the keys, it looks unappealing to touch, but two plastic gloves laying on either side imply the presence of a recent user. This tells the viewer that despite its apparent obsolescence this device is useable by some unknowable being, one that lives outside the trajectory of high technological design. Untitled (Too Thick), 2018, in a similar manner is a cell phone that has been extruded to the point that it is too thick to hold or use. It appears like many phones stacked and formed into one monolithic device, from which a bulging black interface emerges. I think of this too as useable and knowable and habitable, qualities of Black life that are only understood by those living within it. The final sculpture was a 12 x 12 grid of cracked smartphones on the floor, titled No State, 2018. I wanted to allude to the broken phones used by many though they are told this is inappropriate or that there is something wrong and that they should get a new phone. I wanted to consider the space of brokenness as habitable and knowable, rather than a site of rejection.

I didn’t feel that it was possible to depict the black gooey as an interface. I found that my own images of what an interface could be never exceeded exaggerated variations of the interfaces that have already become ubiquitous. For this reason the only working interface in the exhibition was the command-line. This was a means of abstraction by leaving the possible iterations of a software relatively untapped. Most of the formal decisions of the works were manifest as hardware.

KC:

This response is so great and rich.

The title Mother of All Demos comes from a famous demonstration by Douglas Engelbart in 1968. In histories of computing, people will draw a hard distinction between Engelbart’s NLS or oN-Line System and Apple’s later version of the graphical interface (Thierry Bardini’s book Bootstrapping makes this point). So while both used panes or windows, some would say that Engelbart didn’t actually pursue one of the models of abstraction you define below. Yes, he introduced symbolic layers between the user and the computer. But he did so to “augment” the human by embedding him (it was always “him” in these histories) more deeply in the computer (he spoke of the human and the computer “co-evolving”) rather than freeing the human of the computer as in the doctrine of “user friendliness.” But I think that approaching this history through Black Studies, while not erasing such distinctions, sees or refracts them differently. Your Mother of All Demos (2018) refers to Engelbart’s work but also to Apple’s work, two decades later. What connects those strands of the GUI’s history, for you? You say the two plastic gloves flanking the computer refer to a user, and that “[t]his tells the viewer that despite its apparent obsolescence this device is usable by some unknowable being, one that lives outside the trajectory of high technological design.” This unknowable being, seen alongside with your desire not to depict but to, in a certain sense, abstract new technologies, suggests that maybe what connects these histories is the way they participate in a history of personhood, of shifting conceptions of (as Sylvia Wynter might put it) the human.[7]

AA:

I think this gives too much credit to Engelbart. Whenever I discuss the history of computing, especially critically, there are two camps, those who don’t have a particular stance on it and those that are invested in the mythology of its creators. The Mother of All Demos is extremely famous because it was the first example of a demo, and it displayed technologies that were extremely innovative at the moment. But these two eras, that of Apple and SRI are united in their humanistic approach which effaced subjectivity for an early form of freedom in technology. Though Steve Jobs and Engelbart were working at different moments they share a similar subjecthood by being white men in tech who are major proponents of “innovation” as an inconsequential benevolent pursuit. The reason I associate them with one another in Black Gooey Universe is because the tools that Engelbart designed were eventually co-opted into the Apple Lisa. Their differing intentions are only significant under a framework that takes for granted the similarities they share.

When I say “unknowable being,” I don’t mean a non-being. What I’m referring to is the impossibility of the white men designing technology to ever empathize or understand the lived experience of someone outside of their demographic, that is the “unknowable being.” In Black Gooey Universe, I’m referring to the Black user. But this basic argument could be applied to many users that aren’t present in the design process, whether that means they are physically not present, or it means they have secured jobs in the field but are ideologically indoctrinated into a process that maintains the status quo. The decision to depict the user as unknowable to everyone visiting the gallery was to abstract what unknowability looks like, which wouldn’t have happened if I had made a computer that was meant to only be used by Black people, for example. First of all, what would that even look like? Second of all, people would see it and assume they understood it. I wanted to convey this other space outside of our collective knowledge of how a device is supposed to be, that upholds its own eloquent logic that viewers want to understand.

KC:

You mentioning offhandedly a computer “meant to only be used by Black people,” alongside the idea we’ve been discussing that computers have of course been designed by and FOR white people, makes me think about the limitations of inclusion as a model of justice or repair. While I have lots of faith that computers would look very different today if they had been envisioned all along with significant, equal input from Black people (which basically is a thought experiment that requires rethinking the world from the ground up), I have almost no faith at all that if a cadre of “post-racial” designers had Black people in mind as their model computer users the results would be any better. Different, maybe, but as you say, there’s a great danger in people “assum[ing] they understood.” So while exclusion is brutal and violent and distorting, inclusion isn’t an adequate response. A world structured on racism introduces asymmetries everywhere (I think this is, in part, why Moten and Harney are so skeptical about critique in Undercommons). In this context, your thinking about “unknowability” as a form of abstraction seems really important. Can you unfold a little more slowly what you mean when you say that with Black Gooey Universe you wanted to (and I love this phrasing) “abstract what unknowability looks like?” For example, how does abstraction there work in relation to the form of abstraction we discussed before, where the GUI abstracts the computer by introducing a distance, but also by creating an interface that assumes it knows something about its user (abstracting the computer, but also abstracting the human)?

AA:

I wasn’t trying to portray a post-racial group of designers that would have Black people in mind, what I’m saying is Black people have Black people in mind—but regardless, I agree that “inclusion” is not an end-all method of attaining justice or repair, I’m just thinking about decolonization in the realm of technology, which reflects the patterns of society at large. While I agree that decolonizing technology as such is impossible I don’t think that it shouldn’t be thought about or even attempted. I think being dismissive toward any possibility of reconciliation also precludes whatever realities we might discover through that process. I would rather the designers of Silicon Valley drive themselves into a hole trying to reconcile their practices than to dismiss it as a non-viable option. I think the only ethical position in this moment for people with various privileges is a position of embarrassment or discomfort—the discomfort of acknowledging your privilege, the discomfort of knowing that reconciliation may not be possible, and the discomfort of attempting it anyway, that’s what people should be prepared for.

I think what you’re saying also reflects how an afro-pessimistic logic informed my thinking around these works. For Afro-Pessimists, anti-blackness is not reconcilable. Society as such necessitates anti-blackness to maintain itself. The only viable solution to decolonial practice is ending the world. This is a very cut-and-dry theory that really does say reconciliation is not possible without the destruction of the world. In my works this was useful for—rather than thinking of how to fix the white screen or make it “inclusive”—imagining the black realm that exists but hasn’t been categorized as a realm at all.

In a recent work, which is a continued exploration of Black Gooey Universe, I thought about what a practice might be for bringing the devices we’re familiar with, those white-screened interfaces, into the Black Gooey Universe. Untitled (Portal), 2018 is a sculpture and Don’t Boil Your iPhone in Coca-Cola!, 2018 a video, where we witness someone place a working iPhone into bubbling black goo in anticipation of a violent chemical reaction. In the video this is an entertaining test of the iPhone’s integrity, but the subtext is that this practice will bring the phone into the Black Gooey Universe, or make the interface Black. What actually happens in the video is that a plume of smoke comes out of the device and the phone is destroyed. The subtext of this is that the two realms are ultimately irreconcilable.

KC:

Maybe your idea of the irreconcilability of the black realm brings us to a last way to understand abstraction. In this sense, abstraction could be an affective response—what the black realm feels like from the perspective of, say, Apple designers, who live on the other side of that barrier of irreconcilability. But also a differently-organized aesthetic category—in your work Don’t Boil Your iPhone in Coca-Cola!, this might be the plume of smoke: an abstraction, which is also evidence of literal destruction, that discharges from the forced encounter between two irreconcilable realms.

You also let us to go back to something we discussed earlier: the “troubling aspect,” as you put it, “of working at the intersection of art and technology.” It’s a scale problem, in a way. It’s like no one knows quite what scale to work at when dealing with the impacts of technology on life. It does relatively little to add a few black designers to the team of people working on the iPhone, much as we might want and fight for that small change. But then if the single technology is not the right unit of analysis, then what is it? The platform? The stack? The network? Or just the world itself? And Black Studies, specifically Afro-Pessimism, might say in response, yes, that’s precisely the problem, the scale of analysis is never large enough, it goes right up to the very destruction of the world, which is irreconcilable with life as we know it.  And that is precisely the productive impasse to which Black Studies, and maybe a Black Studies-inflected media art brings us: the plume of smoke.

In addition to any responses you might have to these thoughts, would you mind concluding by talking about where your work and thinking about the Black Gooey Universe goes from here?

AA:

That’s a funny image, I do think white people feel like they’re putting out fires when they respond to criticism from us, so it makes sense that this failed reconciliation would look like a plume of smoke. Attempts at “diversity and inclusion” after the fact always feel like water being thrown on a fire. it reminds me of how, whenever someone is critical of an institution that was not designed with them in mind, they are a problem, especially Black women. But let’s say the plume of smoke is the end of the world—I think of it as a non-event, that’s the other layer to this film, it’s humorous, it’s comic relief, as if to say “let’s go ahead and end the world. Let’s do it all over again, without colonization this time…”

As far as the scale of the criticism I’m honestly not so interested in the specific physical forms of computers and hardware. I’m interested in the immaterial aspects that are more timeless and that affect people on a social scale. There are conditions we associate with computers and smartphones that I’m interested in—living post-internet, gratuitous data accumulation, biometric surveillance, and algorithms that influence how we live. These mechanisms allow the same social problems to be reinstated in new ways. For example, I’m really influenced by Simone Browne’s notion that methods used to traffick enslaved people are early forms of biometric technology, such as branding and identifying them based on their physical features.[8] It’s really interesting to me to think about what things haven’t changed in all that time. Rather than focusing on the iPhone, what do the iPhone and the Book of Negroes have in common? If you can identify enough cross sections between the past, present, and future then the specific devices fade into the background and the unfavorable intentions embedded in them start to emerge.

I’m not sure where I go from here with Black Gooey Universe. Part of making an argument is that you quickly realize the limitations of your own critique. But I do think the central idea is very much intact and something I feel strongly about. Someone asked me how Black Gooey Universe manifests socially and I thought about Black artists that make space online for Black people to celebrate Black content, for example Mandy Harris Williams’ #BrownUpYourFeed or RAFiA’s #ForBlackHealing among others. It feels very much like the environment they facilitate online was never meant to exist within the platform and they work really hard to maintain it because they know we need it. I think this is perhaps a way to think about it.

 

BIOS

American Artist lives and works in Brooklyn, NY. Their practice makes use of video, installation, new media, and writing to reveal historical dynamics embedded within contemporary culture and technology. American Artist’s legal name change serves as the basis of an ambivalent practice—one of declaration: by insisting on the visibility of blackness as descriptive of an american artist, and erasure: anonymity in virtual spaces where “American Artist” is an anonymous name, unable to be googled or validated by a computer as a person’s name. American Artist attended the Whitney Independent Study program as an artist. They are a resident at Abrons Art Center and a 2018-2019 recipient of the Queens Museum Jerome Foundation Fellowship. They have exhibited at The Kitchen, New York; the Studio Museum in Harlem; Museum of Contemporary Art Chicago, and have participated in group shows internationally. They have published writing in The New Inquiry and New Criticals and have had work featured in Mousse, ARTnews, AQNB, and Huffington Post. Artist is a co-founder of the arts and politics publication unbag.

Kris Cohen is Associate Professor of Art and Humanities at Reed College. As the Mellon Network Fellow at the Clark Art Institute (Williamstown, MA) in 2019, Kris will be completing a new manuscript that accounts for how a group of Black artists working from the sixties to the present were addressing, in ways both belied and surprisingly revealed by the language of abstraction and conceptualism, nascent configurations of the computer screen and the forms of labor and personhood associated with those configurations.

[1] Safiya Umoja Noble, Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism (New York: New York University Press, 2018).

[2] David N. Pellow and Lisa Sun-Hee Park, The Silicon Valley of Dreams: Environmental Injustice, Immigrant Workers, and the High-Tech Global Economy, Critical America (New York: New York University Press, 2002).

[3] Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, “On Software, or the Persistence of Visual Knowledge,” Grey Room 18 (January 2005): 26–51.

[4] Susan Cahan, Mounting Frustration: The Art Museum in the Age of Black Power, Art History Publication Initiative (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016).

[5] See, for instance: Frank B. Wilderson, Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).

[6] Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study (Wivenhoe; New York; Port Watson: Minor Compositions, 2013).

[7] Sylvia Wynter and David Scott, “The Re-Enchantment of Humanism: An Interview with Sylvia Wynter,” Small Axe 8 (September 2000): 119–207.

[8] Simone Browne, Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015).

Basket of Nothing (1990): Cady Noland is a Base Materialist

Cady Noland, Basket of Nothing, 1990. Wire basket with assortment of building tools and materials. 17 x 16 x 32 in.  LA MoCA.

Cady Noland’s Basket of Nothing is a loose collection of objects that sometimes sits on the floor of the Los Angeles Museum of Contemporary Art. The essay that follows is mainly ekphrastic, an attempt to describe a work of art that strikes me as carefully designed to resist description. Somewhat more tentatively, this essay is also an attempt to describe the ambiguities of an artistic project that is aimed at withdrawal. I am taken by certain of Noland’s works for their radical, sometimes painful refusal to participate in our ready-made historical and aesthetic framings. In its resistance, Noland’s work is best described as abject, formless, “an act of delivery,” as Yve-Alain Bois put it in his description of George Bataille’s notion of L’informe.[1] And yet there is a project there: an intentionally and carefully composed work of art. This essay is a provisional attempt to describe this project of intentional resistance.

~

The easiest way to begin a description of Cady Noland’s Basket of Nothing would be to tick through the various objects that make up this “assemblage”: two rusty shopping baskets, nested together, sit on the ground, filled with an array of objects: a smallish Marlboro sign, a plastic clip hanger (the kind that comes with a purchase from a big-box store), a small bottle of “Neutra Rust,” still in its chip-board and plastic packaging (announcing that it “conquers rust anywhere!”), the remnants of another chip-board package (this one, with its plastic face removed), a narrower, shallower, metal basket, and a range of tool-like objects, littering the lower register of the baskets, the most dominant being two long, metallic items, with red components and prominent handle-like elements.

To begin with such a description feels misguided, however, if not insincere. This is after all, as the title suggests, a basket of nothing. You can name the objects collected there, as I have tried to do, but that brings you no closer to their individual or collective identity. Sitting on the floor, the work stubbornly maintains its lowly origins. It will not rise to the occasion; it may draw your attention, as it did mine when I first encountered it at LA MoCA, but it will not respond in kind. It is that refusal, that turning away, that I find most compelling in Noland’s Basket. It is a turning away, a non-directionality, that I liken to the most radical abstractions of the twentieth-century and I’d like to use Noland’s work, however provisionally, in order to begin to articulate the value I discern in certain forms of abstraction in and as practice.

It is first necessary to acknowledge that abstraction is decidedly not the context in which Noland’s work is typically placed. Counted among a group of young artists coming of age in New York’s East Village in the 1980s, Noland’s practice was featured at the core of what we once called the “postmodern.” Wryly embracing art’s post-historical status, Noland and her peers, such as Steve Parrino, Sherrie Levine, Allan McCollum and Richard Prince, were said to have turned their attention, as one curator put it, to the “darker reaches of the American psyche,” producing works of art that uncomfortably mirrored a depthless and excessive culture of consumption.[2] In considering Noland’s Basket of Nothing through the lens of abstraction, I want to resist this tendency to read her work as either a symptom or reflection of late-twentieth-century American culture. In order to do so, it is necessary to look past what the objects are that populate Basket of Nothing and to instead attend to what they do. One of the primary things they do, I think, both singly and pulled together in this particular way, is to deny the viewer. Basket of Nothing requires an observer, even draws an observer, as it did me, but, I contend, it does not respond to her.

I realize, as I say this, that I sound a lot like Michael Fried, whose theory of absorption in opposition to theatricality promotes an aesthetics of disinterest that, as Fried put it, “repudiates” any identification between viewer and work of art.[3] The turn away from the viewer that I understand Noland’s Basket to enact, however, is not a moral imperative applicable to all art. It is too cynically phrased for that, too basely articulated. For modernists like Fried, art’s turning away from the viewer is a testament to its ability to transcend our base, literalist lives and to gesture toward, to act as proof of, another ideal truth that exceeds our all-too-human desires and modes of meaning-making. Basket of Nothing offers no such transcendence.

And yet it turns away. What I’d like to explore is the value of that turn in pointing us toward not a higher meaning, but an other meaning, one that is specifically and, to me, reassuringly, not human. I want to be clear, however, that I also do not find in Noland anything like the post-human, object-oriented ontologies that the so-called “new materialists” seek out and define.[4] What draws me to this work is the manner by which it, as a whole, along with its component parts, refuses to be identified as an “actant” in our world.[5] Which is to say, what draws me to Basket of Nothing is its aggressive powers of withdrawal not just from the “human” but also from any sensible relations whatsoever. As I’ll explain, the work’s refusal of sensible relations is formalized in its being made up of objects designed for human use. Its contents can largely be described as equipment, but equipment which is expired, spent, inert.[6] Such a withdrawal strikes me as an apt counter to the insistence in so much of New Materialism to speak on behalf of the “nonhuman” in order to demonstrate “the active powers issuing from nonsubjects.”[7] Basket of Nothing refuses what for me is the mistaken kernel at the heart of so many object-oriented theories: what Jane Bennett, in a very different light, refers to as “human hubris.” The nonhuman agency that New Materialists struggle so insistently to describe for their human readers is one that, to return to Bennett, “circulate[s] around and within human bodies.”[8] For all its object-oriented rhetoric, New Materialism is, in the end, aggressively human-oriented, “motivated,” as Bennett says “by a self-interested or conative concern for human survival and happiness […].”[9] Noland’s Basket promises something else entirely: a lack of animation, an end to action, and, most aggressively, a refusal to matter. Again: Basket of Nothing is not directed toward the viewing subject; it is a strangely careful construction of withdrawal from that subject. This is another possible departure from New Materialism. For, as I’ll explain in more detail, Basket of Nothing seems to me to be a deeply intentional object, carefully construed by the human-subject who made it. That intentional configuration, however, does not seek the world.[10]

The “work” put into something like Basket of Nothing, the facture of the thing, can be difficult to identify as such. The items seem carefully placed in order to appear as though they were not intentionally assembled and yet there are other, more positive signs of intention. The one that gets me most is the clothing hanger clipped to the top of the Marlboro sign. An empty gesture to be sure, but a gesture nonetheless. One can’t help but look for other signs of intentionality—are the red objects concentrated in one place? Was red a theme? Why two baskets and not one? Are these random configurations, the whole thing perhaps a found object, or are these carefully chosen arrangements, composed, which is to say meant? The work raises such questions, which are embedded in its appearing (at least somewhat) composed, but artfully redirects those questions.[11]

That redirection might be read as a radical refusal of intentionality and a cultivation of something like Roland Barthes’s notion of a “third meaning.” For Barthes, the “third meaning,” which he first glimpses in Sergei Eisenstein film stills, is a “signifying accident,” a particular “trait,” that gestures toward a meaning outside of or oblique to informational or symbolic meaning and which does not necessarily have a clear content or purpose.[12] The detail, such as the over-powdering of an actor’s face, “outplays meaning” even while remaining within the field of signification. Barthes characterizes the third meaning as a kind of signification that escapes intended meaning and resists made structure. Not objectively given, it emerges out of a willful mis-reading (or a “mutation of reading”). That the third meaning is a function of viewer reception, however misguided, is made clear in Barthes’s insistence on reading Eisenstein’s films through the medium of the still—a “quotation” from the narrative structure of the film. Barthes’s third meaning, this is to say, is the result of an act of reading that is located, as is his theory of the punctum, in the idiosyncratic response to random traits captured by a technological apparatus. But Noland’s basket is too reticent for this sort of understanding—there is no “obvious meaning” out of which an “obtuse” meaning is capable of being generated. Noland’s work does not move enough into the field of signification for it to have any meaning at all, let alone an obtuse one. In this regard, Noland’s work is much more in-line with Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit’s notion of the aesthetics of impoverishment—there is no unintended meaning in such work because the work “[f]ails to represent (either meaninglessness or meaning).”[13]

There is, in fact, a moment in Barthes’s description of the obtuse meaning when he gestures toward just such a blockage: in his own “oblique” mention of Georges Bataille’s essay “The Big Toe,” Barthes states that this lowly body part “situates…one of the possible regions of obtuse meaning.” But the big toe is not simply obtuse according to Bataille. It is not meaning arrived at via other means. Rather, the big toe is base. That is, it does not begin in formulated concepts only to veer off into newly productive modes of meaning making. It is that which precedes meaning and must be overcome in order to achieve any meaning at all. “Opening [one’s] eyes wide…before a big toe,” according to Bataille, means seeing the base origins of our most transcendental thoughts and desires. This is no oblique, implied or sublimated meaning that finds expression via other means, but an origin: a physical reminder of the dumb origins that all thought aspires to transcend. For Bataille human content is produced out of this very effort to ascend from the “obscure baseness,” which provides “a firm foundation to the erection [the standing upright] of which man is so proud.”[14] The toe, that is, might be obscured by our desire to see “human life … as an elevation” and it might figure obliquely, as it does in Barthes’s essay, in our elevated rhetoric that tends always, as Bataille said, “in favor of that which elevates.” But it is in fact always present and necessary—the base foundation to our ideals, the excrement that ensures our further appropriations. It is crucial, then, to understand—pace both the New Materialists and the structuralists—base meaning as meant. An intentional act, but one that is not, as it is for Fried and his followers, aimed at “the sharable intelligibility of human deeds,” as Robert Pippin puts it.[15]

Sitting on the floor, filled with discarded objects, including that unopened bottle of Neutrarust, which, un-grasped, is impotent to stay the further decay of the baskets in which it has come to rest, Basket of Nothing, like Bataille’s big toe, provides a confrontation with base matter, contributing, in this way, to what Bataille called a “base” or “intransigent materialism.” Noland’s careful arrangement succeeds in showing us not matter transformed or in vital conversation with other matter or matter ready-to-hand, but “base matter,” which is “external and foreign to ideal human aspirations,” refusing “to allow itself to be reduced to the great ontological machines resulting from such aspirations.” As a work of base materialism, it is not the objects themselves that resist our “ideal human aspirations,” but Noland’s configuration of them. Noland herself is a base materialist, invested as an agent in a refusal of art’s ascent.

That Noland’s works are intentionally composed is signaled by the fact that Noland is a notoriously shrewd monitor of her works’ preservation and display. She has attempted to de-authorize several works that she insists were damaged or incorrectly displayed by careless registrars, curators, and dealers.[16] One can’t help but wonder what it is exactly that Noland is protecting? What is the artistic vision that she’s guarding and to what purpose? What I’d like to propose is that she is protecting the carefully crafted refusal of these heterogeneous objects to cohere into a meaningful unity. This resistance goes against the generic assumptions embedded in the assemblage form, which is typically presented as obtaining a unity through authorial intervention: which is to say, by being assembled. As art historian and curator John Elderfield claimed, through the manipulation of “heterogeneous” materials the assemblage artist crafts a “unity,” submitting these materials to her will.[17] Noland’s assemblages strike me as carefully constructed in order to resist just such a unity. Despite the fact that art historians and critics insistently read her work as assemblages of socially resonant objects, most often finding references to violence, masculinity, and nationality there, I find that her best works maintain a stubborn refusal to be stitched into a social narrative. They utilize materials that could obviously be read as resonant, but those materials are made, through Noland’s intervention, resistant to our ambitions to make meaning of them, to “appropriate,” in Bataille’s terms, even the most abject discards of our struggle for ascent.

Which returns me to my characterization of Noland’s Basket of Nothing as a work of abstraction. Such a characterization could be viewed as a refusal of the very base materiality that I’m claiming the work strives for: the earliest abstract artists aimed at obtaining abstract ideals in two and three-dimensions in order to transcend all material limits. This was of a piece with European artists’ desire to put into the world not representations of nature or illustrations of philosophical ideals, but their equivalents. To paraphrase Kandinsky, the abstract work of art does not replicate, reflect, or reference the world; they create a world. Bataille’s definition of base materialism very specifically refuses all those abstractions that he associated with idealism. As such, the deeply Hegelian aspirations of the “first” abstractionists, who were striving for an ideal unity in their works, should be regarded as directly opposed to what Bataille characterized as the heterogeneous and unclassifiable nature of base matter. However, Bataille does acknowledge that base materialism itself—that is, the project of describing base matter and, in particular, the heterogeneous nature of base matter, the study of which he termed heterology—is necessarily a process of abstraction. For any effort at classifying truly heterogeneous matter, of rendering it concrete through description and making it an object of knowledge, must be avoided. “Heterology,” Bataille states, “is opposed to any homogeneous representation of the world,” opposed “to any philosophical system.”[18] As such, any “envisaging” of “objective heterogeneity” must necessarily unfold in the abstract.

This is the mode of abstraction in which Noland works. Her own interventions are directed not at knowing, classifying, or—to return to the art of assemblage—transforming matter, but, rather, toward the preservation of matter’s heterogeneity, or at least, gesturing toward such a preservation, which may, in the end, prove impossible. In a manner that may seem to contradict everything I’ve said about Noland’s refusal to create socially resonant unities out of these diverse objects, Noland does seem drawn to particular kinds of objects. The objects that repeat themselves most often in her assemblages are broken tools, walkers, pipes, barriers, canes, fences: materials that point to the limits of human action. Basket of Nothing, for example, is full of tools—demonstrated by their ready-to-hand design—that evoke the human hand even as they withdraw from it. One way to describe the simultaneous gesture toward and withdrawal from the hand in Noland’s baskets is as “non-figurative,” a term used, in the discourse of visual art, interchangeably with “abstraction.” Noland’s works are non-figurative not only in their eschewal of representation, but also in the operation by which the figure is evoked only to be cut off, rendered impotent, brought low. It’s worth recalling here that Bataille described the big toe as the “most human part of the body,” in that it most distinguishes our morphology from the ape’s. The ape’s “toe” is more like a thumb, Bataille contends: it is a grasping and tool-like foot. Whereas our toe remains non-functional, driven into the mud, ignominious, terrestrial, “real.” The broken, retreating tools that fill Noland’s baskets, the canes and walkers and her abiding interest in stockades, all deny confidence in the body’s erection, pointing instead toward the fall that marks every individual’s end: the fall back to earth, which our un-grasping big toe never left. In returning to earth, we fall out of the world; in falling out of the world, we fall away from meaning.

Noland’s Basket of Nothing formalizes this fall. It is not a reassurance of something beyond our limits, but, rather, assurance in our limits and, as such, that we humans are not the limit. This, I suppose, is New Materialism’s promise though it has phrased that promise in such a way as to be deeply inarticulate at times. The objects that comprise Basket of Nothing do not matter and that lack of mattering points to the ways abstraction can stand apart from, as opposed to alongside or above the human.

[1] Yve-Alain Bois, Formless: A User’s Guide (New York: Zone Books, 1997), 18.

[2] Christian Rattemeyer, “Cady Noland,” in Modern Women: Women Artists at the Museum of Modern Art (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2010), 397.

[3] Michael Fried, Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 173.

[4] See, for example, Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).

[5] Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

[6] I mean to use “equipment” here in a manner akin to Heidegger’s in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Basic Writings: From Being in Time to The Task of Thinking, David Farrell Krell, ed. (London: Harper Perennial, 2008), 143-212.

[7] Bennett, Vibrant Matter, ix

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid., x.

[10] The idea of not seeking the world is in part inspired by Lauren Berlant’s recent lecture “On Being in Life Without Wanting the World (Living with Ellipsis).”

[11] For a discussion of composition and intentionality see Howard Singerman, “Noncompositional Effects, or the Process of Painting in 1970,” Oxford Art Journal Vol. 26, No. 1 (2003), 127-150. For a discussion of the intentional avoidance of composition see Yve-Alain Bois, “Ellsworth Kelly in France: Anti-Composition in Its Many Guises,” in Ellsworth Kelly: The Years in France, 1948-1954 (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 1992).

[12] Roland Barthes, “The Third Meaning: Research notes on some Eisenstein stills,” in Image Music Text, Stephen Heath, trans. (New York: Hill & Wang, 1978).

[13] Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, Arts of Impoverishment: Beckett, Rothko, Resnais (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 14.

[14] Georges Bataille, “The Big Toe,” Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939, Allan Stoekl, trans (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 20.

[15] Robert Pippin, After the Beautiful: Hegel and the Philosophy of Pictorial Modernism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 64.

[16] See Andrew Ruseth’s “Cady Noland Works, and a New Disclaimer, Appear at the Brant Foundation,” Art News (http://www.artnews.com/2014/11/10/cady-noland-work-and-a-new-disclaimer-appears-at-the-brant-foundation/). The disclaimer added to the Brant’s work reads: “”Because Ms. Noland have [has] not been involved with the chain of provenance with many of my [her] pieces, there are more situations like this show which place demands on her time and the artist’s attention to ensure proper presentation of her art work (including its representation in photographs), than she has time or capacity to be involved with. She reserves her attention for projects of her own choosing and declined to be involved in this exhibition. The artist (or C.N.) hasn’t given her approval or blessing to this show.”

[17] John Elderfield, Essays on Assemblage (Studies in Modern Art) (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1992).

[18] Bataille, “The Big Toe,” 98.

The Abstraction Issue: An Introduction

Two regimes of abstraction have stared each other down for much of the twentieth century: aesthetic abstraction in its flight from objectivity, from fidelity to a world of objects made available to the senses, and financial abstraction in its own flight from objectivity, from the body and its too-limited capacity to work, from the social and its constraining norms and logics. Aesthetic abstraction and commodity abstraction. It’s not that these regimes haven’t known of each other’s presence—on the contrary, the two are deeply reliant on the each other in their respective articulations. This knowing, however, has taken a peculiarly veiled form. Eve Sedgwick once referred to “the privilege of unknowing”: the ability to forget because not much would change with that forgetting, because some privilege (bodily, financial, often both) allowed the world not to collapse.[1] This barrier has existed, has been imposed, between the two regimes of abstraction precisely so they can feed off of each other without knowing much about each other. Willful, phantasmatic, utopian—that barrier has had many valences. What motivates its persistent imposition is something like desire. On the side of aesthetics, a desire for autonomy, to carve out some space to the side of capitalism to imagine things otherwise. On the side of the commodity, a desire to acquire what it wants, when it wants it, to pilfer in the dark or in the light, by whatever means it deems necessary—means often themselves borrowed from that other, parallel regime of abstraction. While work got done in that space of unknowing, historical forces pushed the two regimes ever nearer—the aesthetic inspiring the financial; the financial infecting and enabling the aesthetic. The privilege of unknowing that stands between them has become harder to sustain, requiring more privilege, or just more unknowing.

The end of the twentieth century has accelerated abstraction’s ascent from ideology to a kind of period logic.[2] There has been no time, during the twentieth century, or before, when abstraction hasn’t been an issue, or when abstraction hasn’t had its issues—with vision, representation, figuration, money, language, culture, economy, power, the laboring body. Each period, and each corresponding locus of abstraction, has its own specificities. The specificity that drives our present airing of the issue of abstraction is the violent, if not sudden, coincidence of aesthetic and financial modes of abstraction. Artworks that take financialization as their subject constitute one historical example of this coincidence: Yve Klein’s “Ritual for the Transfer of a Zone of Immaterial Pictorial Sensibility” (1965), Ai Wei Wei’s Han Jar Overpainted with Coca-Cola Logo (1995), Santiago Sierra’s 250 Cm Line Tattooed on 6 Paid People (1999), Mendi and Keith Obadike Blackness for Sale (2001), Andrea Fraser’s Untitled (2003), Damien Hirst’s For the Love of God (2007), or Vermeir and Heiremans’s Art House Index (ongoing). The financialization of the art market, of course, presents another.[3] What becomes of aesthetic ambitions in the crucible of this coincidence? How do bodily, representational, and financial abstraction encounter one another, vie, collaborate, become parasitical in this collision between the aesthetic and the financial? What are abstraction’s current verbs, its modalities of action, of flight?

The four essays that make up this issue move in and around these questions, leaving questions in their wake, different questions and, hopefully, other questions than those that have sustained the conversation about abstraction to date. Steyn Bergs asks the question that has haunted so much art and art criticism during this period: what should art do or be when many of its manifestations simply take on the form of financial abstraction, simply look and act—as does the work of Vermeir and Heiremans who are Bergs’s subject—like instruments of financialization? What should critics do with those works that appear to simply repeat, or worse, reproduce the brutal and arcane logics of financial abstraction? Christa Noel Robbins takes on the work of Cady Noland in order to better articulate just what abstraction refuses today and how those radical refusals might continue to instruct, if not edify, in the wake of radical financialization. Barbara Jaffee describes the genesis of pictorial abstraction in the U.S. in the early twentieth century: a diagrammatic approach to representation that borrows from the developments of Taylorism as a method for organizing functional units. And in the final essay, a conversation between American Artist and Kris Cohen, abstraction is viewed—obliquely, inversely, inveterately—through the resources of Black Studies in order to address the modes of abstraction that have motivated and issued from the invention of the graphic user interface (GUI or “gooey”), now native to all personal computers and computing devices.

We recognize that all of this may appear to sideline definitional and typological questions: What really is abstraction? How is abstraction to be classed in relation to representation, to materiality, to the world as given to the senses? What kind of organizing principle for art is abstraction now? Is bodily or figural abstraction somehow the same operational process as financial abstraction? For that matter, are all contemporary financial instruments operating in and through the same forms of abstraction: home loans, the stock market, blockchain? Does abstraction always entail an escape, a pulling away from as its dictionary definition asserts? Perhaps, but only if we attend to its diverse and multiple points of departure. If, for instance, the personal computer abstracts from the social body, by reducing the laboring body to a short circuit connecting eye and hand, or by sidelining the body altogether in favor of more seemingly self-determined modes of identification, then at what cost, at whose cost, do we accept that monolith “the body”? Or “nature”? Or “representation”? Or “objectivity”? All of those sites where abstraction has seemed to do its most concerted work. Such questions never lack for asking, or for answers. But something nags as something escapes. Maybe the definitional, the typological, is precisely what abstraction most strenuously escapes?

This is no more true for art than for, say, bundles of high-risk home loans, so to say that abstraction escapes, abstraction resists, is now far from a radical statement, or even a statement with a recognizable politics.[4] Maybe it’s a statement of the problem abstraction poses for politics, including the aesthetic kind. All of the articles in this special issue grapple with this impasse: is abstraction now a position to be occupied? Or is there no avoiding it? Is it a kind of movement or current—historical, aleatory, forever driven by capital and commodity—to be tracked, described on the run? If artists once took abstraction as their method and subject, now it claims them as its own: what is a computational algorithm but a way to abstract the body, the self, the very means of self-elaboration into a form that is better adapted to being tracked, rendered informatic, and productive of commodities?

Perhaps this stretches a word too thin. If concepts are never more or less than “provisional generalizations,” then the provisions that sustain them must sometimes become exhausted, outlived.[5] That is a question that must hang over this issue. Our ambition has been not to let it hang there melancholically, but to grasp it experimentally: to see what can be done with it now, what it can (and can’t) describe, how far it takes us into other imaginaries, or just other vocabularies. We, too, wanted to know what abstraction is, but once the question is asked historically rather than definitionally, all answers will be provisional.

We’d like to thank all of our contributors for the work they’ve done to think abstraction on the run, to respond so graciously and creatively to our comments, to bring the issues of this issue to light, and to teach us what they know.

 

[1] Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Privilege of Unknowing,” Genders 1, no. Spring (1988).

[2] On the period logic of abstraction, see for instance: Seb Franklin, Control: Digitality as Cultural Logic (MIT Press, 2015); Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” October 59, no. Winter (1992): 3–7.

[3] Fredric Jameson, “Culture and Finance Capital,” in The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998 (London and New York: Verso, 1998); Stefan Heidenreich, “Freeportism as Style and Ideology: Post-Internet and Speculative Realism, Part I,” E-Flux, no. 71 (March 2016), https://www.e-flux.com/journal/71/60521/freeportism-as-style-and-ideology-post-internet-and-speculative-realism-part-i/; Heidenreich Heidenreich, “Freeportism as Style and Ideology: Post-Internet and Speculative Realism, Part II,” E-Flux, no. 73 (May 2016), https://www.e-flux.com/journal/73/60471/freeportism-as-style-and-ideology-post-internet-and-speculative-realism-part-ii/.

[4] See Ina Blom, “The Logic of the Trailer: Abstraction, Style and Sociality in Contemporary Art,” in Abstraction, Maria Lind, ed. (Documents of Contemporary Art) (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013).

[5] Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Deconstructing Historiography,” in Deconstruction: Critical Concepts in Literary and Cultural Studies, ed. Jonathan D. Culler (London ; New York: Routledge, 2003), 17.